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 ATTITUDES TOWARD RISK
 AND THE RISK-RETURN PARADOX:
 PROSPECT THEORY EXPLANATIONS
 AVI FIEGENBAUM
 University of Michigan
 HOWARD THOMAS
 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 This study attempted to explain Bowman's risk-return paradox in terms
 of recent research in behavioral decision theory and prospect theory.
 The research emphasized the role of reference, or target, return levels
 in analyzing risky choices. For returns below target, a large majority of
 individuals appear to be risk seeking; for returns above target, a large
 majority appear to be risk averse. Using extensive COMPUSTAT-based
 data on U.S. firms, we consistently found a negative risk-return associa-
 tion for firms having returns below target levels and a positive associa-
 tion for firms with returns above target. These results support the basic
 propositions of prospect theory and are extremely robust within and
 across industries and for all time periods studied.
 The relationship between risk and return has received considerable at-
 tention from researchers in business administration, economics, and finance.
 Conventional economic wisdom (e.g., Brealey & Myers, 1981) suggests that
 risk and return are positively correlated.
 Existing research studies, most of which are summarized in Table 1,
 have largely supported a positive risk-return association. However, Bowman
 (1980) discovered that within most industries, risk and return were nega-
 tively correlated. He described that research outcome as a paradox for strate-
 gic management, since the findings ran counter to the conventional wisdom
 that argued for a positive association. He also argued that firms' risk attitudes
 may influence risk-return profiles and that more troubled firms may take
 greater risks (Bowman, 1982, 1984).
 This study attempted to explore the role of attitudes toward risk in the
 management of strategic risk and thus to enrich understanding of Bowman's
 risk-return paradox. Recent research in behavioral decision theory and pros-
 pect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Laughhunn, Payne, & Crum, 1980)
 has suggested that individuals use target, or reference, points in evaluating
 risky choices. Further, individuals are not uniformly risk averse but adopt a
 mixture of risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors. Indeed, the evidence
 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Laughhunn et al., 1980; Mao, 1970; Siegel,
 1957) suggests that when returns have been below target, most individuals
 85
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 are risk seeking and that when returns have been above target, most are risk
 averse.
 From a research viewpoint, it is important to question whether the re-
 sults of experiments on individuals' attitudes toward risk and risky choice
 behaviors (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Laughhunn et al., 1980) can be
 translated into the world of corporate organizational behavior. Bowman (1982)
 noted that the literatures of economics and political science have both of-
 fered models, commonly described as rational-actor models (Allison, 1971),
 advancing the proposition that organizations may act like individuals. Indeed,
 his research, based on content analyses of companies in three industries,
 confirmed the notion that companies' behaviors may be similar to those of
 individual decision makers. He found that troubled companies, like troubled
 individuals, take larger risks, thus supporting the adaptation of risky choice
 research to the context of corporate decision making.
 Therefore, in this study we developed a research methodology to test the
 hypothesis that risk attitudes, conceptualized in terms of prospect theory's
 utility function, can explain the relationship between risk and return both
 across firms and within industries. We expected risk-seeking attitudes (a
 convex value function) below target, or reference point, return levels and
 risk-averse attitudes (a concave value function) above target return levels.
 That expectation leads in turn to a hypothesis of a U-shaped risk-return
 function (see Figure 1, curves 3 and 4) and the expectation of negative
 risk-return associations below target levels and positive risk-return associa-
 tions above target levels.
 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
 Risk-Return Research
 Table 1 summarizes some of the important studies that have examined
 risk-return patterns in different industry contexts. Positive risk-return rela-
 tionships have commonly emerged in cross-sectional studies examining both
 industry-level and firm-level data, even where researchers controlled for the
 industry effect (Conrad & Plotkin, 1968; Cootner & Holland, 1970; Fisher &
 Hall, 1969; Hurdle, 1974). The relationship appears to hold regardless of
 firms' national identities (Neumann, Bobel, & Haid, 1979).
 Negative risk-return relationships emerge when alternative measures are
 included in studies (Armour & Teece, 1978; Bowman, 1980, 1982, 1984;
 Treacy, 1980). Such measures range from the nature of the industry, the time
 period studied, firm size, diversification strategies, risk measures, and risk
 attitudes. For example, negative risk-return associations are more common
 when data are from the 1970s than the 1960s (see Table 1) and when mea-
 sures are accounting-based rather than market-based (Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
 1985, 1986). The evidence on diversification strategy and risk indicates that
 related diversification strategies exhibit negative risk-return associations
 (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Bettis & Mahajan, 1985), whereas unrelated strategies
 86  March
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 TABLE 1
 Risk-Return Association: Summary
 of Major Empirical Studies
 Time Intervening Risk-Return
 Studies Period Samples Variables Associations
 Conrad & Plotkin 1950-65 783 U.S. companies Industry effect Significant positive
 (1968)
 Fisher & Hall
 (1969)
 Cootner & Holland
 (1970)
 Hurdle (1974)
 Armour & Teece
 (1978)
 Neumann, Bobel,
 & Haid (1979)
 Bowman (1980)
 Treacy (1980)
 Bowman (1982)
 Bettis (1981)
 Bettis & Hall
 (1982)
 Bettis & Mahajan
 (1985)
 representing 59
 industries
 1950-64 11 U.S. industries Industry effect
 1946-60 315 U.S. companies Industry effect
 representing 39 and time
 industries
 1960-69 228 U.S. firms
 representing 85
 industries
 1955-73 28 U.S. firms from
 the petroleum
 industry
 1965-73 334 West German
 industrial stock
 companies
 1968-76 (a) 1,572 U.S.
 companies repre-
 senting 85 industries
 1972-76 (b) 11 industries
 1966-75 1,458 U.S. com-
 panies representing
 54 industries
 1979 Food processing,
 computer, and
 container industries
 in U.S.
 1973-77 80 U.S. com-
 panies
 Industry effect
 Time
 Firm size
 Industry effect
 association
 Significant positive
 association for both firm
 and industry level
 Significant positive
 association for both firm
 and industry level; the
 industry relationship
 was consistent for each
 year
 Significant positive
 association for both firm
 and industry level
 Negative but not
 significant association
 Significant positive
 association for the
 whole sample; when the
 sample was divided into
 big and small companies,
 positive and negative
 association was found
 Significant negative
 association within
 industries; in addition,
 negative but not signifi-
 cant association across
 industries
 Firm size Significant negative
 association within and
 across industries
 Troubled
 situations
 Diversification
 strategy and
 industry char-
 acteristics
 Significant negative
 association within
 industries for troubled
 companies
 Significant positive
 association for un-
 related firms; significant
 negative association for
 related firms; no
 statistically significant
 association for related-
 linked firms
 87 1988
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 TABLE 1 (continued)
 Time Intervening Risk-Return
 Studies Period Samples Variables Associations
 Marsh & Swanson 1958-81 135 U.S. firms No statistically signifi-
 (1984) cant association
 Fiegenbaum & 1960-79 Ranges from 345 Time Significant positive
 Thomas (1985) to 700 U.S. com- association in the 1970s;
 panies representing significant negative
 7 industries association for 1965-69.
 Fiegenbaum & 1960-79 Ranges from Time and risk Significant negative
 Thomas (1986) 1,283 to 2,394 measurement association for ac-
 U.S. companies counting measures of
 representing 37 to risk in the 1970s;
 56 industries, significant positive
 respectively association for
 accounting measures of
 risk in the 1960s; no
 statistical significance
 for market risk measure
 exhibit positive risk-return associations. Finally, risk attitudes also appear to
 influence troubled firms to seek greater risks (Bowman, 1982), thus leading
 to an observed negative risk-return association.
 Behavioral Decision Theory and Risk Taking
 Most of the literature dealing with risky choice behavior assumes that
 decision makers are risk averse. That assumption is a basic premise of much
 research in business, finance, economics, and management science. In terms
 of utility theory, the assumption implies that a decision maker has a utility
 function that is uniformly concave or that individuals depart from risk-
 averse behavior only under unusual circumstances. Many researchers
 (Friedman & Savage, 1948; Grayson, 1959; Markowitz, 1952; Swalm, 1966)
 have questioned the assumption of global risk aversion on both theoretical
 and empirical grounds.
 Recent advances in behavioral decision theory (Fishburn, 1977; Fishburn
 & Kochenberger, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Laughhunn, Payne, &
 Crum, 1980) have emphasized the role of reference, or target, levels in the
 analysis of risky choices. Current evidence (summarized in Table 2) reveals
 that most individuals exhibit a mixture of risk-seeking and risk-averse
 behavior, with the range of the returns where those two risk preferences are
 the predominant modes of behavior being intimately connected with the
 notion of a target return. For returns below target, most individuals appear to
 be risk seeking; for returns above target, a large majority appear to be risk
 averse, which is consistent with one of the main predictions of prospect
 theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Recently, Singh (1986) used this re-
 search framework to investigate the relationship between oranizational per-
 formance and risk taking. He found the direct relationship, triggered by
 88  March
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 TABLE 2
 Behavioral Risk-Return Studies
 Author Types of Studies Findings
 Friedman & Savage (1948) Theoretical
 Markowitz (1952)
 Grayson (1959)
 Swalm (1966)
 Fishburn (1977)
 Fishburn &
 Kochenberger (1979)
 Kahneman &
 Tversky (1979)
 Laughhunn, Payne, &
 Crum (1980)
 Theoretical
 Empirical
 Empirical
 Theoretical
 Empirical
 Empirical
 Empirical
 Utility functions a mixture of risk
 seeking and risk aversion. Three-
 segment function: convex (risk
 seeking) surrounded by two con-
 cave segments.
 Proposed a four-segment bounded
 utility function of wealth; convex-
 concave-convex (around present
 wealth)-concave.
 Nine executives engaged in oil
 and gas drilling decisions. Utility
 functions mixture of risk seeking
 and risk aversion in domain of
 losses; evidence of risk seeking
 behavior for gains.
 Thirteen executives in chemical
 industry; 9 out of 13 utility func-
 tions were risk averse for gains;
 risk seeking for losses.
 Specified a mean-risk dominance
 model in which risk is measured
 by a probability-weighted function
 of deviations below a specified
 target return.
 Used data from earlier studies.
 Predominant form of
 risk preference involved convexity
 (risk seeking) below target
 returns and concavity (risk aver-
 sion) for above-target returns.
 Provided a substantial amount
 of empirical laboratory evidence
 to support the proposition that the
 utility function will be convex for
 losses and concave for gains, with
 gains and losses measured relative
 to a target return.
 Provided extensive laboratory
 evidence using 237 managers to
 support decision makers' use of a
 target return or reference point
 in the analysis of risky choice
 behavior.
 1988  89
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 TABLE 2 (continued)
 Author Types of Studies Findings
 Singh (1986) Empirical Cross-sectional sample of 64
 medium-to-large U.S. and Cana-
 dian companies. Found that or-
 ganizational performance has a
 negative relationship with risk
 taking in organizational decision
 making, and that poorly per-
 forming organizations engage in
 more risk taking than organiza-
 tions that are performing well.
 performance below acceptable levels, to be negative but found the indirect
 relationships, which are mediated by organizational slack and decen-
 tralization, to be positive.
 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODS
 According to prospect theory, the risk-return relationship has a nonlin-
 ear functional form. Below the target return level, decision makers are risk
 seeking, and above the target level, decision makers are risk averse. There-
 fore, assuming individual decision maker's and firm's risk preferences are in
 one-to-one correspondence, we can state our broad formal research
 hypotheses.
 Hypothesis 1: A negative association between risk and
 return exists for firms below target return levels.
 Hypothesis 2: A positive association between risk and
 return exists for firms above target return levels.
 More focused research hypotheses are:
 Hypothesis la: A negative association between risk and
 return exists for firms below target return levels within
 industries.
 Hypothesis lb: A negative association between risk and
 return exists for firms below target return levels across
 industries.
 Hypothesis 2a: A positive association between risk and
 return exists for firms above target return levels within
 industries.
 Hypothesis 2b: A positive association between risk and
 return exists for firms above target return levels across
 industries.
 Determining a Target Level
 An important issue in operationally defining prospect theory is to iden-
 tify a measure for the target return level. There is no general rule that defines
 March 90
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 an appropriate target for each situation, although Tversky and Kahneman
 (1981) and Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum (1980) drew a close analogy be-
 tween a target return level and a reference point. In this study, the traditional
 literature of financial statement analysis provided a basis for setting an ap-
 propriate return target. Lev (1969: 290) suggested that firms adjust their
 performance to the industry average. He emphasized "the desirability of
 adjusting the firm's financial ratios to predetermined targets which are usu-
 ally based on industry wide averages." Lev also performed an empirical
 study on 900 major U.S. firms, in which he confirmed the hypothesis that
 firms periodically adjusted their financial ratios to their industry means.
 Frecka and Lee (1983) used another data set for a study of financial ratios,
 and their results support Lev's hypothesis that firms adjust financial ratios
 in a dynamic fashion to targets that appear to be industry-wide averages of
 those ratios. Therefore, an average performance (return) level may serve as
 an appropriate proxy for a given firm's target level.
 Since the purpose of this study was to test the nature of the assocation
 between risk and return both within and across industries, we used two
 different target return levels. First, for firms within the same industry, the
 industry's median return on equity (ROE) was the target measure.' Second,
 the overall median ROE was used as the target across industries.
 Time Period, Measures, and Data
 The COMPUSTAT data base was used to develop a research data set of
 firms and industries for the 1960-79 time period. We chose that period
 because it represented a wide range of economic and environmental condi-
 tions and also covered the range of time periods examined in Bowman's
 (1980, 1982) studies. Separate analyses were then performed for the nonover-
 lapping 5-year periods 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, and 1975-79, for the 10-
 year periods 1960-69 and 1970-79, and finally, for the entire 20-year period
 1960-79. We analyzed different time periods in order to examine the possibil-
 ity that time period influences risk-return results. For each period, we calcu-
 lated the average ROE and variance of ROE as accounting-based measures of
 firm return and risk. Many researchers have used the variance of a firm's
 return over time as a proxy for risk2 (Armour & Teece, 1978; Bettis, 1981;
 Bettis & Hall, 1982; Bowman, 1980; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Fisher
 & Hall, 1969; Rumelt, 1974). Accounting measures of risk were used in this
 study so that the research results would be comparable with previous studies-
 We chose the median ROE because it represents the middle point of the return distribution
 and is unaffected by extreme outliers. Thus, the median may better indicate managerial percep-
 tions of target performance than the mean.
 2 Apart from correspondence with previous studies, two other considerations led us to
 evaluate total risk, or variance of returns, rather than systematic risk (beta). First, managers are
 responsible to a wider set of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) than just shareholders, making the
 examination of total risk an important concern. Second, beta is both empirically and theoreti-
 cally related to total risk (Foster, 1978).
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 particularly Bowman's 1980 and 1982 studies-that have used the same
 measures.
 In order to examine Hypotheses la and 2a, which concern the nature of
 the risk-return association within industries, the following procedure was
 adopted. For each time period, we calculated the average ROE and variance
 of ROE as measures of return and risk for each firm in each Standard Indus-
 trial Classification (SIC) two-digit industry. Only industries with at least five
 firms below and five firms above the target level were included. Within each
 industry, we constructed a rank order of all firms based on average ROE for
 the time period and divided it at the median. Firm with values for ROE
 below an industry's median were considered as below target, and vice-versa.
 The total population included 47 industries and 2,322 firms for 1975-79, the
 latest period that we analyzed.
 Hypotheses lb and 2b, which concern risk-return patterns across indus-
 tries, were examined in a similar manner. As in the case of the industry-level
 research, we calculated the average ROE and variance of ROE as measures of
 return and risk for each firm for each time period. We then constructed a
 rank order of all firms across all industries based on average ROE for the time
 period and divided it at the median. We considered firms below the median
 as below target, and vice versa. Again, the population included 2,322 firms
 for 1975-79.
 Statistical Tests for Investigating the Risk-Return Association
 Two basic nonparametric approaches were used to examine the associa-
 tion between risk and return. First, we performed contingency table analysis,
 following methods used in previous research (Bowman, 1980; Fiegenbaum &
 Thomas, 1985, 1986). For each category-below target return and above target
 return-we constructed a rank order of all firms for each of the two charac-
 teristics, ROE (return) and variance in ROE (risk), and divided the rank order
 at the median. We then deemed each firm as high or low on each of the
 characteristics, in effect producing four quadrants in a two-by-two contin-
 gency table: high ROE, high variance (HH); high ROE, low variance (HL); low
 ROE, high variance (LH); and low ROE, low variance (LL). We then calcu-
 lated negative risk-return association ratios3 (HL + LH divided by HH + LL)
 for each category, for each SIC two-digit industry, for each time period, and
 for all firms pooled across industries.
 Second, measures of risk-return association based on Spearman rank
 order correlation coefficients (Winkler & Hays, 1975: 867) were calculated
 from the risk-return rank order data derived from the industry and firm
 risk-return analyses.
 Thus, Spearman rank order correlations and negative association ratios
 were calculated for each SIC two-digit industry and for the entire group of
 3 A negative association is implied if the values of the calculated negative association ratios
 are significantly above 1.0. Similarly, there is a positive association if the ratios are significantly
 below 1.0.
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 firms. We repeated the procedure for each of the seven time periods, 1960-64,
 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1960-69, 1970-79, and 1960-79.
 RESULTS
 Appendices A and B present detailed research results for the benefit of
 future researchers. However, Tables 3 through 6 summarize the main results.
 Results for Below-Target-Level Firms
 Industry level. The risk-return association was calculated for each
 industry. Table 3 presents the results of both the Spearman correlation and
 negative association ratio analyses. In the case of the Spearman risk-return
 correlation analysis, negative risk-return correlations emerged for most in-
 dustries in each time period. We performed a binomial test, similar to
 Bowman's (1980) version, to test the null hypothesis that there is no associa-
 tion between risk and return, or equal numbers of positive and negative
 correlations (p = 0.50). We rejected that hypothesis in favor of the alternative
 hypothesis that risk and return are negatively correlated at p < .01 for each
 time period (see column 2.) When we considered only industries with a
 significant positive or negative association between risk and return (column
 3), we found that negative association was the dominant mode (column 4).
 The negative association ratio results (column 5) also support the domi-
 nance of negative risk-return associations; most ratios are significantly greater
 than 1.0 across industries.
 Firm level. The ROE median was calculated for all firms, pooled across
 industries. The left-hand side of Table 4 presents the values of both the
 Spearman correlation and the negative association ratio for below-target firms.
 For every time period, the Spearman risk-return correlation is significantly
 negative (p < .01). The negative association ratio analysis confirms those
 results, showing that the values of the ratios are consistently greater than
 1.0 for all time periods. Therefore, the results shown in Table 4 strongly
 support Hypothesis lb across a wide range of industries.
 In summary, the results in Tables 3 and 4 support Hypothesis 1, stating
 that a negative association exists between risk and return for firms with
 ROEs below the target level for all time periods. In addition, this hypothesis
 is strongly confirmed both within (Hypothesis la) and across (Hypothesis
 lb) industries.
 Results for Above-Target-Level Firms
 Industry level. Table 5 describes the results of both the Spearman analy-
 sis and the positive association ratio analysis (the inverse of the negative
 association ratio). For most industries, positive and highly significant Spear-
 man risk-return correlations emerged (see column 2). When the number of
 industries with a significant positive association was compared with the
 number of industries with any significant association, virtually all industries
 showed a positive association for all periods except 1975-79 (see column 4).
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 TABLE 3
 Risk-Return Association For Firms Below Industry Target Levela
 Industries
 with Significant
 Association
 19
 20
 38
 32
 16
 38
 34
 Industries
 with Significant
 Negative Association
 19 (100)**
 18 (90)**
 38 (100)**
 32 (100)**
 16 (100)**
 38 (100)**
 34 (100)**
 Negative Association
 Ratio Analysis
 Industries
 with Negative
 Association Ratio
 23 (67)**
 29 (70)**
 41 (89)**
 42 (89)**
 26 (72)**
 44 (94)**
 42 (91)**
 l Figures in parenthesis represent results as a percentage of (left to right) the total number of industries (tLoulIm 2,t he number of industries with [ \/ \ \ colu n 4 I
 a significant positive or negative association (c'olumn 3 , and the total number of industries "'
 ** ) < .01. Bowman's binomial test. \: \c.OIumil 1/
 Spearman Correlation Analysis
 Time Period
 1960-64
 1965-69
 1970-74
 1975-79
 1960-69
 1970-79
 1960-79
 Number of
 Industries
 34
 41
 46
 47
 36
 47
 46
 Industries
 with Negative
 Association
 30 (88)**
 34 (83)**
 44 (96)**
 47 (100)**
 34 (94)**
 47 (100)**
 45 (97)**
 Q
 0
 C:
 CD
 0
 0
 -
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0
 Or
 CD
 I'D
 3
 0
 C
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 TABLE 4
 Statistics for Firms' Risk-Return Associations
 Below and Above Target Across Industries
 Below Target Above Target _
 Spearman Negative Spearman Negative
 Rank Order Association Number of Rank Order Association Number of Total Number
 Time Period Correlations Ratios Companies Correlations Ratios Companies of Companies
 1960-64 -.45** 1.84 705 .42** .57 705 1,410
 1965-69 -.42** 1.70 946 .55** .42 946 1,892
 1970-74 - .59** 2.27 1,166 .36** .63 1,166 2,332 :
 1975-79 -.60** 2.30 1,210 .36** .61 1,210 2,420
 1960-69 -.48** 2.00 807 .50** .52 807 1,614
 1970-79 -.63** 2.87 1,197 .40** .60 1,197 2,394
 1960-79 -.59** 2.35 1,161 .49** .51 1,161 2,322
 ** p < .01
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 TABLE 5
 Risk-Return Associations For Firms Above Industry Target Levela
 Positive Association
 Spearman Correlation Analysis Ratio Analysis
 Industries Industries Industries Industries
 Number of with Positive with Significant with Significant with Positive
 Time Period Industries Association Association Positive Association Association Ratio
 1960-64 34 29 (85)** 11 11 (100)** 29 (85)**
 1965-69 41 38 (93)** 29 29 (100)** 37 (90)**
 1970-74 46 42 (91)** 22 22 (100)** 34 (74)**
 1975-79 47 35 (77)** 18 17 (95)** 31 (66)**
 1960-69 36 36 (100)** 20 20 (100)** 34 (94)**
 1970-79 47 36 (77)** 27 27 (100)** 35 (75)**
 1960-79 46 42 (91)** 25 25 (100)** 38 (83)**
 a Figures in parenthesis represent results as a percentage of (left to right) the total number of industries with
 a significant positive or negative association ^'m 4 , and the total number of industries ("o"lulln ' .
 **p < .01, Bowman's binomial test. unin 3/ column 1/
 Cm
 Cm
 Qw cm.
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 The positive association ratios (column 5) further confirm the findings of the
 Spearman risk-return correlation analysis.
 Firm level. We again pooled all firms across industries. For each time
 period, the Spearman risk-return correlation coefficient is strongly positive
 (p < .01; right-hand side of Table 4). Further, the calculated negative associa-
 tion ratios were less than 1.0 for all time periods, indicating that risk and
 return are positively correlated.
 In summary, the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the exis-
 tence of a positive association between risk and return for firms with ROEs
 above the target level for all time periods. This finding holds both within
 (Hypothesis 2a) and across (Hypothesis 2b) industries and validates our
 second general hypothesis.
 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS
 This study's results, based on COMPUSTAT data for U.S. industrial
 firms for a wide range of periods between 1960-79, strongly support proposi-
 tions drawn from prospect theory. Earlier studies (Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
 1985, 1986) have shown that the risk-return association may be either positive
 or negative, depending on the period chosen. In contrast, the main contribu-
 tion of this study is that it showed that, when a target ROE value is introduced
 at either the firm or industry level, risk and return are negatively correlated
 for below-target firms and positively correlated for above-target firms regard-
 less of the period or the underlying environmental conditions. Those findings
 suggest, in line with the behavioral assumptions of prospect theory, that most
 firms may be risk seeking when they are suffering losses or are below targeted
 aspiration levels. Conversely, they will tend to be risk averse following
 achievement of aspirations and targets.
 The results of this study also provide confirmation of Bowman's (1982,
 1984) conjectures about risk seeking in troubled firms. Bowman's empirical
 studies, which involved content analysis of annual reports for three indus-
 tries over the 1972-80 period, provided limited justification for the notion
 that managerial risk attitudes, such as risk seeking in troubled environments,
 could explain the risk-return paradox. However, this study provided exten-
 sive confirmation of hypotheses based on both risk-attitude and prospect
 theory because it involved a wide range of environmental conditions over
 the period 1960-79 and a large population covering 47 industries.
 In Figure 1, which graphically shows this study's results, two illustra-
 tive lines describe the association between risk and return. Line 1 represents
 a consistently negative risk-return association, and line 2 represents a consis-
 tently positive risk-return association. However, the results derived from
 this study suggest that the risk-return relationship in both cases is nonlinear
 and U-shaped as curves 3 and 4 respectively exemplify.4 The curves may
 therefore represent the true relationship between risk and return.
 4 Curves of the risk-return relationships were plotted for a small number of industries for
 each time period studied. Although those subgroup results provided strong support for the
 U-shaped function, we did not undertake a full evaluation of all industries for all time periods.
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 FIGURE 1
 Risk-Return Relationships
 4 (Negative association below
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 Below target Target Above target
 Return
 If the U-shaped function is a realistic representation of the risk-return
 association, it seems sensible to examine the risk-return association for firms
 with returns close to a target level. Prospect theory would suggest that there
 will be a very low association between risk and return when firms near the
 target level are considered. In order to test that hypothesis, we divided the
 group of firms into tertiles representing below-target, target, and above-target
 segments. Spearman rank order correlations were calculated at both the firm
 and industry levels. Table 6 presents the results for only the middle segment.
 Most of the industries around the middle, target-segment, tertile show
 no significant association between risk and return (column 2). Spearman
 correlations calculated across firms also show little evidence of a significant
 association between risk and return (column 3). The findings support the
 hypothesis that there is no significant correlation around the target level.
 Although the proposed U-shaped risk-return relationship appears to be
 an appropriate model to explain observed risk-return relationships, further
 research should concentrate on the nature of risk-return trade-offs for firms
 that are categorized as either below or above target level. Such research
 should be carried out first at the industry level in order to control for factors
 March 98
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 TABLE 6
 Results of Spearman Rank Order Analysis for Firms
 Around the Target Level Within and Across Industries
 Within Industries-
 Industries with
 Time Period Number of Industries Significant Associationa Across Firms
 1960-64 34 1 (2.9) --.03
 1965-69 41 7 (17.0) .16 **
 1970-74 46 4 (8.6) -.03
 1975-79 48 5 (10.4) -.11 **
 1960-69 36 4 (11.1) .06
 1970-79 47 6 (12.7) -.05
 1960-79 46 6 (13.0) .001
 a Figures in parentheses represent the percentage of industries with a significant positive
 or negative association (1columnl 2
 * < .1. columnl 1
 and characteristics explaining risk at that level (Baird & Thomas, 1985).
 Within a given industry, some below-target firms may exhibit behavioral
 tendencies like escalating commitment to particular courses of action (Staw,
 1981)5 or organizational inertia in changing circumstances (MacMillan &
 McCaffery, 1982) that may, in turn, lead to the possibility of high risks and
 low returns. However, some large firms may be able to trade off risk and
 return to achieve high returns and low risks and achieve above-target
 performance. However, factors like organizational rigidity or X-inefficiency6
 (Leibenstein, 1966) may impede other large firms from achieving high return-
 low risk profiles. Further studies along the lines of d'Aveni's (1985) paper
 on risk-return strategy trade-offs in the forest products industry should pro-
 vide insights about the nature of risk-return trade-offs within particular
 industries. In addition, other managerial explanations-such as agency the-
 ory and diversification strategy--can be tested more fully in rich, fine-grained
 (Harrigan, 1983) studies of single industries that address how managers frame
 risky choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Such rich studies are also fully
 consistent with Bowman's (1980: 27) suggestion that industry-specific char-
 acteristics like regulation or context (service vs. manufacturing, for example)
 may provide a basis for reasonable conjectures about the causes of observed
 risk-return trade-offs and thus enrich our understanding of the factors influ-
 encing negative risk-return associations.
 5 Whyte (1986) argued that prospect theory provides the psychological mechanisms by
 which to explain escalating commitment to a failing course of action without the need to invoke
 self-justification processes.
 6 Leibenstein defined the efficiency level that a firm actually achieves as its "X-efficiency"
 and termed the shortfall of a firm's actual efficiency relative to the efficiency it could achieve its
 "X-inefficiency." He further argued that X-inefficiency will tend to increase over time unless
 counteracted by forces within an organization like managerial skills in planning, control, and
 work organization.
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 The prospect theory and risk-attitude explanations of the risk-return
 paradox raise the question of whose risk or return is important. Is a manager
 acting as an agent for a firm's principal owners, or is a manager's appropriate
 role to enhance the strategic management capability of the organization?
 Therefore, the relevant issue is to identify which stakeholders affect and
 shape the achievement of an organization's mission. Further, an important
 empirical issue is whether the risk-return paradox exists when the risk per-
 spectives of appropriate alternative stakeholders are taken into account.
 The set of all constituencies of an organization can include owners,
 customers, employees, and suppliers as internal stakeholders and govern-
 ment and competitors as external stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). Although
 managerial, or personal, risk may be best measured using the total risk
 (variance) concept, firm-level risk may be more appropriately measured by
 the systematic risk (beta) concept. Measures of variance involve the arbitrary
 definition of a utility function for a firm. The advantage of identifying a
 firm's risk with its shareholders' risk is that doing so is consistent with the
 classic assumption that a firm operates in the interests of its owners and thus
 enables risk to be identified and priced in securities markets.
 Our earlier study (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986) showed that Bowman's
 risk-return paradox only exists if total risk, not market (shareholders') risk, is
 taken into account. Clearly, any risk study should confront the issue of what
 risk measure is appropriate in a given environment or situation. Market risk,
 ruin, lack of predictability, and personal risk are all potential measures of
 risk, or risk constructs, in given situations. However, the choice of risk
 perspective will surely enlighten us as to the nature of the association be-
 tween risk and return and the possible presence of the risk-return paradox.
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 APPENDIX A
 Negative Association Ratios for Below and Above Industry Targeta
 SIC 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1960-69 1970-79 1960-79
 Group Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N
 1.33 .85 (13) 1.42
 .85 .50 (12) 2.66
 1.33
 .00 .66 (5) .40
 1.62 .64 (41) 1.36
 3.33 .44 (13) .80
 1.33 .85 (13) 1.50
 2.00 .00 (5) 1.50
 .00
 2.00 .80 (18) 1.50
 5.00 .50 (12) 1.50
 1.52 .59 (49) 1.57
 2.33 .46 (19) 2.00
 1.14 1.14 (15) .72
 2.00 .50 (6) 3.00
 .85 .20 (12) 1.14
 2.50 .80 (27) 2.00
 3.66 .42 (27) 1.46
 1.08 .66 (50) 1.42
 2.28 .76 (46) 2.00
 1.83 .94 (33) 1.11
 1.00 .33 (16) 1.60
 .60 (16)
 .57 (22)
 2.00 (6)
 .40 (7)
 .66 (45)
 .54 (17)
 .22 (19)
 .28 (9)
 .66 (5)
 .46 (19)
 .72 (19)
 .50 (48)
 .66 (20)
 .72 (19)
 1.00 (8)
 .33 (15)
 .60 (32)
 .60 (37)
 .41 (68)
 .66 (60)
 .35 (38)
 .47 (25)
 .88 .33 (16)
 4.00 4.00 (5)
 3.42 .47 (31)
 2.00 1.00 (12)
 8.00 .80 (9)
 1.88 .06 (48)
 4.00 .71 (24)
 2.85 .44 (26)
 4.00 .75 (14)
 .00- .66 (5)
 2.00 2.00 (21)
 1.40 .53 (23)
 1.16 .73 (52)
 3.00 .76 (23)
 .66 1.50 (20)
 2.00 .28 (9)
 2.80 .50 (18)
 2.18 .70 (34)
 2.30 .75 (42)
 2.33 .83 (79)
 4.30 .78 (68)
 1.86 .75 (42)
 2.22 .55 (28)
 1.42 .33 (16)
 .00 .50 (6)
 1.69 1.33 (35)
 2.00 2.00 (12)
 2.00 .28 (9)
 1.50 .68 (49)
 4.00 .00 (5)
 3.33 .47 (25)
 13.00 .80 (27)
 2.00 1.00 (15)
 2.00 4.00 (5)
 3.20 .90 (21)
 1.00 .20 (24)
 2.23 1.25 (54)
 2.00 .35 (23)
 1.33 .90 (21)
 .66 .80 (9)
 2.33 1.50 (20)
 2.18 .88 (34)
 2.46 .55 (45)
 2.32 .78 (82)
 2.13 .80 (72)
 1.70 .72 (43)
 2.00 .93 (29)
 2.00 .75 (14)
 1.25 .88 (17)
 2.00 .50 (6)
 1.75 .46 (44)
 1.14 .60 (15)
 1.14 .66 (15)
 .40 .33 (7)
 .80 .50 (18)
 .75 .44 (13)
 1.64 .66 (48)
 2.33 .66 (20)
 2.40 .33 (16)
 6.00 .50 (')
 .75 .75 (14)
 2.50 .55 (28)
 2.00 .36 (30)
 2.00 .70 (53)
 3.07 .73 (52)
 1.53 .38 (36)
 1.00 .42 (20)
 4.66 .60 (16)
 2.00 .66 (6)
 1.83 .41 (34)
 2.00 2.00 (12)
 8.00 .80 (9)
 1.88 .48 (49)
 .66 .00 (6)
 3.33 .47 (26)
 2.85 .85 (27)
 4.00 1.66 (16)
 2.00 4.00 (5)
 6.00 .90 (21)
 1.40 .20 (24)
 1.89 .50 (54)
 1.40 .35 (23)
 1.50 .66 (20)
 2.00 .28 (9)
 5.33 .46 (19)
 2.18 .54 (34)
 4.50 .69 (44)
 2.85 .66 (80)
 5.00 .65 (71)
 2.30 .48 (43)
 4.00 .70 (29)
 1.42 .14 (16)
 4.00 .66 (5)
 3.42 .34 (31)
 5.00 2.00 (12)
 2.00 .80 (9)
 2.76 .60 (48)
 1.77 .50 (24)
 2.85 .40 (26)
 2.50 1.33 (14)
 .00 .66 (5)
 3.20 1.00 (20)
 2.00 .35 (23)
 1.60 .62 (52)
 1.40 .53 (23)
 2.33 .42 (20)
 .80 .80 (9)
 1.11 .28 (18)
 2.18 .70 (34)
 2.30 .61 (42)
 2.43 .69 (78)
 2.28 .61 (68)
 1.86 .50 (42)
 3.14 .55 (28)
 10
 12
 13
 15
 16
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
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 28
 29
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 APPENDIX A (continued)
 SIC 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1960-69 1970-79 1960-79
 Group Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N
 .00 .33 (8)
 .20 1.00 (8)
 2.66 .57 (11)
 .57 .22 (11)
 .90 .52 (76)
 3.33 .85 (13)
 4.00 2.00 (9)
 4.00 1.14 (15)
 .75 .85 (13)
 2.00 .22 (11)
 .76 1.75 (22)
 6.00 .40 (7)
 .80 .80 (9)
 1.33 .33 (7)
 2.00 .57 (11) 2.40 .54 (17)
 2.00 .66 (5) .80 1.00 (8)
 1.50 .28 (9) 10.00 .22 (11)
 2.00 .20 (12) 3.33 1.60 (13)
 1.60 .20 (12) 1.33 .75 (14)
 .92 .92 (79) 1.51 .74 (82)
 .66 .66 (20) 4.40 1.16 (26)
 3.33 .44 (13) 2.00 .60 (15)
 .72 .72 (19) 1.27 .71 (24)
 1.42 .88 (17) 4.00 1.00 (20)
 .50 2.00 (6) 3.00 1.00 (8)
 .40 .50 (6) 4.00 .25 (10)
 4.00 .36 (15) 1.09 .57 (22)
 .96 .83 (57) 1.31 1.03 (67)
 2.00 .57 (11) 1.33 .85 (13)
 2.33 1.11 (19)
 6.00 1.33 (7) 1.60 1.00 (12)
 3.00 .14 (16)
 .00 .50 (6) 1.33 .40 (7)
 1.33 .25 (20) 6.00 .40 (28)
 .00 .28 (9)
 2.00 .66 (5)
 .80 .00 (9) 1.50 .25 (10)
 2.00 .88 (17)
 .80 2.00 (9)
 1.20 .22 (11)
 1.33 1.60 (13)
 2.50 .40 (14)
 .79 .53 (86)
 3.66 1.45 (27)
 1.42 .33 (16)
 4.00 .25 (24)
 4.00 1.00 (20)
 2.00 .33 (8)
 1.50 1.50 (10)
 2.00 1.40 (24)
 1.61 1.57 (67)
 2.50 .40 (14)
 1.20 1.20 (22)
 14.00 .75 (14)
 16.00 .60 (16)
 1.33 1.33 (7)
 4.80 .27 (28)
 1.50 .80 (9)
 2.00 .50 (6)
 4.00 1.50 (10)
 2.00 .28 (9)
 4.00 .00 (5)
 8.00 .33 (8)
 10.00 .57 (11)
 5.00 .50 (12)
 1.33 .87 (77)
 1.14 .75 (14)
 1.20 .25 (10)
 1.00 .60 (16)
 2.00 1.14 (15)
 .85 .85 (13)
 1.36 .62 (52)
 .40 .40 (7)
 .66 .00 (5)
 1.14 .40 (14)
 .80 1.00 (8)
 2.40 .88 (17)
 .80 .80 (9)
 2.66 .22 (11)
 .00 3.33 (13)
 2.50 .16 (14)
 1.38 .72 (86)
 3.66 1.07 (27)
 3.00 .60 (16)
 4.00 1.00 (24)
 2.33 1.00 (20)
 3.00 3.00 (8)
 4.00 1.50 (10)
 2.00 .53 (23)
 1.83 2.94 (67)
 2.50 .44 (13)
 1.75 .83 (22)
 2.00 .75 (14)
 4.66 .60 (16)
 1.33 1.33 (7)
 4.80 .40 (28)
 4.00 2.00 (9)
 2.00 .00 (5)
 1.50 .25 (10)
 2.40 .60 (16)
 .00 3.00 (8)
 2.66 .25 (10)
 3.33 .44 (13)
 2.50 .16 (14)
 1.67 .64 (82)
 1.45 .44 (26)
 2.00 .60 (15)
 1.27 .71 (24)
 2.33 .66 (20)
 3.00 3.00 (8)
 4.00 .25 (10)
 2.28 1.20 (22)
 1.31 1.16 (67)
 2.50 .18 (13)
 1.50 .72 (19)
 1.60 2.00 (12)
 7.00 .60 (16)
 1.33 .50 (6)
 3.66 .27 (28)
 1.50 .80 (9)
 .00 .66 (5)
 1.50 .00 (10)
 'N gives the number of firms in each category. In every case there are an equal number of firms in the below- and above-target categories.
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 APPENDIX B
 Spearman Correlations for Below and Above Industry Targeta
 SIC 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1960-69 1970-79 1960-79
 Group Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N
 10 -.46* -.17 (13) -.17 .56 (16)* -.09 .68 (16) -.31 .40 (16) -.48* .19 (14) -.75* .54 (16)* -.53* .60 (16)*
 12 -.80* -.80 (5) -.77* .54 (6) -.88* .10 (5) -.90* .10 (5)
 13 -.19 .22 (12) -.69* .35 (22)* -.66* .48 (31)* -.34* -.06 (35) -.62* .21 (17) -.49* .36 (34) -.57* .34 (31)*
 15 .17 -.54 (6) -.58* .20 (12) -.56* -.34 (12) -.55* -.27 (12) -.70* -.27 (12)
 16 -.71 .40 (5) -.03 .21 (7) -.90* .16 (9) -.65* .66 (9) -.42 .60 (6) -.75* .16 (9) -.75* .20 (9)
 20 -.31* .47 (41)* -.32* .36 (45)* -.48* .35 (48)* -.49* .34 (49)* -.40* .54 (44)* -.49* .48 (49)* -.67* .40 (48)*
 21 -.60 .70 (5) -.20 1.00 (5)*
 22 -.57* .17 (13) -.06 .42 (17)* -.51* .23 (24) -.87* .51 (25)* -.24 .41 (16) -.82* .38 (25)* -.68* .57 (24)*
 23 -.34 .39 (13) -.49* .70 (19)- -.67* .44 (26)* -.84* .03 (27) -.06 .58 (15)* -.70* .42 (26)* -.61* .56 (26)*
 24 -.37 .60 (5) -.15 .51 (9) -.82* .38 (14) -.77* .10 (16) .14 .33 (7) -.83* -.10 (16) -.89* .23 (14)
 25 .90* .70 (5) -.82* -.30 (5) -.60 -.50 (5) -.77* -.80 (5) -.94* .70 (5)
 26 -.36 .24 (18) -.33 .64 (19)* -.43* -.18 (21) -.45* .35 (21) -.18 .49 (18)* -.69* -.01 (21) -.66* .25 (20)
 27 -.70* -.04 (12) -.46* .38 (19)* -.53* .45 (23)* -.07 .64 (24)* -.01 .17 (13) -.21 .52 (24)* -.30 .64 (23)*
 28 -.33* .42 (43)* -.42* .43 (48)* -.27* .33 (52)* -.54* .14 (54)* -.36* .34 (40)* -.44* .40 (54)* -.33* .51 (52)*
 29 -.56* .41 (19)* -.51* .42 (20)* -.40* .25 (23) -.42* .72 (23)* -.56* .48 (20)* -.29 .52 (23)* -.38* .63 (23)*
 30 -.31 -.12 (15) .007 .49 (19)* .18 -.09 (20) -.56* .13 (21) -.26 .54 (16)* -.44* .33 (20) -.33 .60 (20)*
 31 -.65 .48 (6) -.33 .61 (8)* -.68* .71 (9)* -.006 .30 (9) -.89* .65 (6) -.38 .70 (9)* -.06 .41 (9)
 32 -.10 .36 (12) -.15 .51 (16)* -.78* .62 (18)* -.55* .21 (20) -.03 .42 (14) -.84* .58 (19)* -.53* .46 (18)*
 33 -.75* .13 (27) -.54* .49 (32)* -.59* .40 (34)* -.52* .23 (34) -.64* .31 (28)* -.60* .47 (34)* -.58* .36 (34)*
 34 -.72* .62 (27)* -.51* .47 (37)* -.70* .33 (42)* -.60* .43 (45)* -.48* .55 (30)* -.57* .43 (44)* -.45* .55 (42)*
 35 -.22 .31 (50)* -.38* .58 (68)* -.66* .25 (79)* -.60* .37 (80)* -.41* .37 (53)* -.68* .30 (80)* -.53* .38 (78)*
 36 --.57* .28 (58)* -.54* .40 (60)* -.74* .23 (68)* -.65* .21 (72)* -.60* .28 (52)* -.76* .23 (71)* -.57* .47 (68)
 37 -.56* .12 (33) -.28* .65 (38)* -.63* .42 (42)* -.47* .29 (43)* -.54* .58 (36)* -.59* .42 (43)* -.48* .54 (42)*
 38 .05 .30 (16) -.41* .55 (25)* -.60* .25 (28) -.61* .22 (29) -.32 .53 (20)* -.66* .29 (29) -.55* .18 (28)
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 APPENDIX B (continued)
 SIC 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1960-69 1970-79 1960-79
 Group Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N Below Above N
 -.95*
 -.60*
 -.53*
 .06
 .09
 -.51*
 -.64*
 -.65*
 -.29
 .42 (8)
 .14 (8)
 .11 (11)
 .56 (10)*
 .38 (76)*
 .26 (13)
 .15 (9)
 .32 (15)
 .03 (13)
 -.55* .78 (11)*
 .11 -.17 (22)
 -.92* .67 (7)*
 -.23 -.05 (9)
 -.67* .61 (7)*
 -.58* .34 (11) -.54*
 -.54 -.30 (5) .35
 -.64* .89 (9) -.87*
 -.72* .79 (12)* -.64*
 -.60* .78 (12)* -.22
 -.04 .24 (79)* -.25*
 .15 .50 (20)* -.73*
 -.52* .80 (13)* -.60*
 .15 .23 (19) -.22
 -.26 .35 (17) -.72*
 -.02 -.65 (6) -.90*
 .50 .71 (7) -.67*
 -.39 .62 (15)* -.19
 -.03 .33 (57)* -.18
 -17 .50 (11)* -.49*
 -.49*
 -.03 .28 (7) -.53*
 -.77*
 -.77* .60 (6) -.42
 -.22 .54 (20)* -.77*
 -.75*
 -.75*
 .65* .86 (9)* -.80*
 .24 (17)
 .16 (8)
 .61 (11)*
 .06 (13)
 .20 (14)
 .21 (82)*
 .25 (26)
 .25 (16)
 .54 (24)*
 .14 (20)
 .07 (8)
 .67 (10)*
 .50 (22)*
 .06 (67)
 .15 (13)
 .09 (19)
 .03 (12)
 .78 (16)*
 .60 (7)
 .62 (28)*
 .75 (9)*
 .20 (5)
 .58 (10)*
 -.75* .31 (17)
 -.05 -.18 (9)
 -.24 .70 (11)*
 -.27 -.56 (13)*
 -.37 .60 (14)*
 -.11 .34 (86)*
 -.64* .23 (27)
 -.33 .64 (16)*
 -.53* .53 (24)
 -.79* -.02 (20)
 -.83* .35 (8)
 -.73* -.26 (10)
 -.60* -.25 (24)
 -.47* -.17 (67)
 -.63* .78 (14)*
 -.06 -.06 (22)
 -.66* -.29 (14)
 -.88* .46 (16)*
 -.28 -.03 (7)
 -.74* .68 (28)*
 -.49 .08 (9)
 -.42 .42 (6)
 -.80* .18 (10)
 -.81* .43 (9) -.69* .16 (17)
 -.60 .70 (5) -.16 .26 (9)
 -.73* .71 (8)* -.64* .69 (11)*
 -.70* .60 (11)* -.86* -.08 (13)
 -.58* .51 (14)* -.52* .70 (14)*
 -.12 .20 (77)* -.18* .37 (86)*
 -.36 .09 (14) -.71* .25 (29)
 -.32 .62 (10)* -.64* .50 (16)*
 -.05 .31 (16) -.45* .39 (24)*
 -.19 .43 (15)* -.71* -.14 (20)
 -.90* -.33 (8)
 -.67* -.13 (10)
 -.20 .48 (13)* -.36* .41 (23)*
 .0006 .40 (52)* -.57* .47 (67)*
 -.21* .53 (7) -.39 .51 (13)*
 -.57* .04 (22)
 -.26 .09 (14)
 -.82* .38 (16)
 -.50 .60 (5) -.10 -.03 (7)
 -.01 .38 (14) -.81* .71 (28)*
 -.89* -.21 (9)
 -.14 .90 (5)*
 -.10 .20 (8) -.73* .83 (10)*
 -.70* .20 (16)
 .59 -.19 (8)
 -.54* .95 (10)*
 -.72* .21 (13)
 -.36 .78 (14)*
 -.33* .39 (82)*
 -.50* .43 (13)*
 -.46* .52 (15)*
 -.03 .25 (24)
 -.46* .05 (20)
 -.52 -.26 (8)
 -.55* .66 (10)*
 -.50* .37 (22)*
 -.36* -.16 (67)
 -.36 .76 (13)*
 -.52* .16 (19)
 -.28 -.47 (12)
 -.83* .39 (16)
 -.60 .25 (6)
 -.80* .71 (28)*
 -.47 .31 (9)
 -.88* .60 (5)
 -.38 .81 (10)*
 ' N gives the number of firms in each category. In every case there are an equal number of firms in the below- and above-target categories.
 * p < .05
 K
 (-)
 3
 3
 40
 42
 45
 48
 49
 50
 51
 53
 54
 56
 58
 59
 60
 61
 63
 65
 67
 70
 73
 80
 89
 99
 Q
 CD
 0
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